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Theodor Adorno’s Versuch über Wagner stands after Nietzsche’s assorted polemics
as perhaps the most sophisticated, provocative, and enduring critique of Wagner and
his oeuvre, certainly fromwhat we might loosely term the political Left. Yet it remains
much misunderstood, often taken, from Carl Dahlhaus’s initial review onward, for
a far more unremittingly hostile attack than it was either intended as or actually
became.1 Thomas Mann wrote that he had always believed Nietzsche’s Wagner criti-
que to be an “inverted panegyric” (Panegyrikus mit umgekehrtem Vorzeichen), “another
form of celebration.”2 Much the same, though not quite in the same way, might be
said of Adorno’s book too, and not only because Nietzsche’s critique so often pro-
vides its starting points. It helps to understand Adorno’s Versuch within the German
tradition, initiated at the latest by Nietzsche, of offering a “case of Wagner,” a case
that must be addressed.3 That there is a “problem,” a “case,” few would deny. After
all, one of Wagner’s greatest interpreters, Wilhelm Furtwängler, provided his “case
of Wagner, freely after Nietzsche” as an essay, opening with the estimable claim
that Wagner was “the most highly controversial figure in the entire history of the
arts.”4 Adorno and Furtwängler had more in common than one might necessarily
expect, though they were hardly kindred spirits; nevertheless, both in their different
ways were attempting both an exploration of Wagner and his rescue (Rettung), to
employ a term of which Adorno was fond.5
Adorno’s book was published by Suhrkamp in 1952, although it had for the
most part been written between autumn 1937 and spring 1938 in London and
New York, and four chapters had appeared previously in the 1939 Zeitschrift für
Sozialforschung. He later explained that he had “endeavoured to combine sociologi-
cal, technical-musical, and aesthetic analyses in such a manner that, on the one
hand, societal analyses of Wagner’s ‘social character’ and the function of his work
would shed light upon its internal composition. On the other hand—and what
seemed to me more essential—the internal-technical findings in turns should be
brought to societal expression and be read as ciphers of societal conditions.”6 The
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paperback edition, published in 1963, brought minor changes, but nothing sub-
stantive.
Adorno admitted, however, in his preface to that edition that “the author’s more
recent views on Wagner would not have fitted into the framework of the present
study.” For those views, he pointed to an essay, “‘Zur Partitur des Parsifal,’ found in
the Moments Musicaux,” and to his “talk, ‘Wagners Aktualität,’ given during the
September 1963 Berliner Festwochen, [which] has not yet appeared in print.”7 In
the latter, which soon did appear in print, he conceded that he would “today. . .
formulate many things in the book differently. Its central problem, that of the rela-
tion between societal aspects on the one hand and compositional and aesthetic
aspects on the other, might have to be argued more profoundly within the subject
matter than it was then.” Nevertheless, he continued, “I am not distancing myself
from the book, nor am I abandoning the conception.” Indeed, if anything, his asso-
ciation, however partial, of Wagner with National Socialism was stated more baldly:
“As the National Socialist potential continues to smoulder within the German
reality now as then, so it is still present in Wagner.”8 Wagner had certainly not been
neutralized by the passing of time.
Reception in the English-speaking world has not been helped by Rodney
Livingstone’s strange translation of the title as In Search of Wagner, when Essay on
Wagner would have been more accurate.9 Experiment upon Wagner or An Approach
toward Wagner might even have laid some claim to partial validity, given the senses
in which the composer is tested as a case of “enlightenment”—in good part avant
la lettre. There is little sense of seeking after his antagonist; indeed, John Deathridge,
in his astute 1983 review of the English edition, went so far as to say that Adorno was
“definitely not ‘in search of Wagner.’”10 Wagner had rather been there all along. The
question was what to do with him; perhaps even, in Wagnerian terms, whether there
were still hope for his redemption. Or at least for his rescue, Rettung being the term
Adorno used in a 1952 “self-advertisement” of the book.11 Adorno wished to act as a
critical Elisabeth to Wagner’s Tannhäuser—a noble aim, one that most Wagner
scholars might wish to share. The problem was that on occasion he lacked not only
Elisabeth’s forgiveness but also the deeper understanding enabled by such forgive-
ness, reverting instead to the horrified party of Tannhäuser’s Minnesänger critics.
Even the dedication, to Adorno’s wife Gretel, suggests something beyond mere
negative polemics. Granted, Adorno’s personal practice of gender relations was no
more admirable than that of Wagner, perhaps even less so; but it is not fanciful to
see a declaration of some unorthodox form of love toward both subject and dedica-
tee.12 Occasionally, Adorno explicitly admits as much, for instance when writing,
“Actually, when one looks not just shallowly, but with passion and admiration”
(which certainly implies that he does), “one can say, with the danger of being mis-
understood, that Wagner’s art arises from a dilettantism monumentalized to the
stature of genius by the highest willpower and intelligence.”13 The words may be
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equivocal, but the balance yet tilts toward panegyric. It might have tilted more
strongly had it not been both for the catastrophe of the Third Reich and for the fact
that, as Adorno explained in Freudian terms to Walter Benjamin, he had never felt
great personal closeness to Wagner. Wagner had been less of a childhood presence
for Adorno than various other great composers: he had “never really belonged
amongst the stars above in my childhood.”14 Yet that critical distance could prove a
strength too.
2
It is not difficult to see how reading Adorno’s Versuch without an awareness of
context might lead to its dismissal—or even celebration—as an overwhelmingly
negative tract. Its opening treatment of Rienzi condemns Wagner for presenting a
puritanical revolt against libertine lifestyle rather than class warfare and having
founded political action in private familial conflict.15 Even, Adorno continues, when
Wagner later managed to achieve his self-trumpeted harmony between “untram-
meled sexuality and the ascetic ideal,” it was only in “the name of death”—though
we might note that is perhaps not quite the same as saying “in death.”16 Yet that
founding of political action in family conflict might be explained in a number of
ways. It is inherent in the story; it stands in a long, Petrarchan tradition of conflict
between Amor and Roma; it is, perhaps most important, typical of Meyerbeerian
grand opéra, which in one strong sense makes Rienzi what it is. Moreover, if we un-
derstand a degree of reconciliation “in the name of death” between sexual freedom
and asceticism—though there are many good reasons why we should not necessari-
ly take Wagner at his word here—then that may be seen to have at least as much in
common with Ludwig Feuerbach’s “progressive,” Young German–Young Hegelian
Thoughts on Death and Immortality, as (proto-)Schopenhauerian resignation. It
would, moreover, take an extremely jaundiced understanding of act 1 of Die Walküre
to follow Adorno’s next major criticism of Wagner’s character, or rather his lack
thereof (Charakterlosigkeit), and see Siegmund’s request for sympathy as pertaining
to the ruling classes (the Herrschenden) rather than straightforwardly to Sieglinde;
for one thing, it is the last thing the proud Volsung would dream of requesting
from the more obviously politically engaged, brutally bourgeois Hunding.17 Put like
that, brief treatment of a few early paragraphs does not bode well. It may be freely
admitted that there is much of that ilk.
However, not only does the perceived necessity of such detailed criticism
suggest an adversary worthy of the name; there is also much, especially if one is
prepared to strip away Adorno’s almost kneejerk negative judgments, that may be
understood more positively. Some judgments—for instance, the endlessly repeated
claim that Wagner’s music rejects time and history, heard at its most extreme
in the assertion that nothing changes during the course of the Ring—remain
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wrongheaded, even baffling.18 Others, however, become richer in their deepening
ambiguity. Adorno’s claim that nothing is unambiguous in Wagner might not only
be turned back upon its writer but also signify greater kinship than he is willing to
acknowledge explicitly. The strong element of Freud in his intellectual makeup
already suggests a degree of projection.
The most crucial element of context is perhaps not Adorno’s writing in the
shadow of the Third Reich (obvious enough), but rather the need to consider
Wagner as an important case study in the Dialectic of Enlightenment, itself of course
highly colored but not necessarily dictated by that political context. (One may say
the same about many of his other works too, not least the Philosophy of New
Music.)19 The picture painted in the opening of Adorno’s book written with Max
Horkheimer informs and is informed by Wagner as the most particular of
nineteenth-century cases. As Andreas Huyssen has noted, “pivotal categories” such
as “myth,” “regression,” and even “reification” are already fully developed in the Wagner
critique—insofar, we might add, as it was penned before the war—“waiting, as it
were, to be articulated in terms of the American culture industry.”20 It is certainly
not a matter of merely “applying” theory to example; that is what makes treatment
of Adorno’s writings so difficult, for there is no one obvious place to start. Lydia
Goehr has pointed out that Adorno “picked up on the thought that philosophy as a
conceptual language stood in a necessarily interpretative relation to languages, like
music, that were not primarily conceptual or conceptual at all.”21 That is true up to a
point, but it is partly a matter of degree. Adorno certainly did not rule out the possi-
bility that music might express concepts.22 Still more to the point, music shaped
what Georg Picht in a memorial tribute dubbed Adorno’s “atonal philosophy” at
least as much as philosophy shaped his music.23 Therefore the interpreter of
Adorno finds himself in a bind, unsurprisingly so, given the dialectic of enlighten-
ment: to begin with, say, the theory of phantasmagoria risks undue abstraction,
whereas to progress to it via the Ring or Tristan risks undue particularity, even
empiricism—but so does Adorno, and necessarily so. One must simply, or not so
simply, decide—almost arbitrarily, yet therefore perhaps defying instrumentalism
—upon a path, and, like Adorno, forge a wayward route that is yet not nonsensical.
Analytical philosophical method will just not work here, offering false, “enlight-
ened” clarification.
Nevertheless, theoretical treatment of instrumental reason looms large: “Myth
turns into enlightenment and nature into mere objectivity. Men pay for the increase
of their power with alienation from that over which they exercise their power.”24 Had
Adorno been a more charitable reader of the Ring, he might have seen more clearly
that the twin bind of instrumental reason is incisively portrayed by Wagner himself,
arguably with a more modern, ecological twist than Adorno, and certainly Marx,
would have approved or even comprehended. Wotan’s creation of a political world is
accomplished both by critical reason, personified in his demigod henchman, Loge,
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and also in his act of violence against the world-ash tree, hewing from its living
branches his spear, a dead instrument upon which runes of legal domination are
inscribed. It is up to us whether we consider Wagner to be caught up within the
bounds of his own myth or to be offering a self-reflexive critique thereof. Perhaps the
more Adornian path—plus adornien que le roi—would be to allow that both possess
more than an element of truth.
For there are good reasons, rooted in Wagner’s dramatic material, why his
oeuvre is particularly well suited to Adorno’s project. Wagner’s alleged “indiffer-
ence towards the ‘inner life’ [Seelenleben] of the individual [character] attests to
traces of political knowledge of the individual’s conditioning by material reality.
Like the great philosophers,” no mean compliment, “he distrusts the private.” That
penetrates to the heart of Adorno’s intriguing analysis of Wagner’s use of myth;
indeed, Adorno proceeds to describe Heidegger as “not dissimilar to Wagner as
a mythologist of language.” The Ring might be summarized by a maxim of
Anaximander, as “recently” analyzed by Heidegger: “From wherever things have
their origin, there too they must also perish according to necessity, for they must
make penance and be judged for their iniquity, according to the rules of time.”
There is a regressive side to that pre-Socratic, fatalist form of redress, not simply
taken as subject matter but forming an aesthetic grounding for the immanent co-
herence of the Gesamtkunstwerk, “art of transition” and all.25 Yet once again Adorno
recognizes, and has the interested reader pursue, alternative, pregnant possibilities.
And we should remind ourselves that Wotan dismisses Erda’s world of fate—though
Adorno’s answer would be that the Gesamtkunstwerk itself remains ensnared by it.26
Already, however, we spy the seeds of the more conciliatory, indeed more dialectical,
claim in “Wagners Aktualität” that “Wagner makes the case for myth, but accuses it
through his creation.”27
Even at its most dubious, for instance in Wagner’s work’s grandfathering of the
culture industry’s cinematic insistence, Adorno detects truth content. If the “tone
adopted by every film” were that “of the witch handing food to the child she wants
to enchant or devour, while mumbling horribly: ‘Lovely, lovely soup. How you’re
going to enjoy it,’ such ‘kitchen-fire witchcraft’ might on the one hand be said to
have been “invented by Wagner, whose linguistic intimacies and musical spices are
forever tasting themselves,” and yet are also indicted by him. “With a genius’s”—
yes, a genius’s—“compulsion to confess,” he had already lain “bare the whole process
in the scene of the Ring where Mime offers Siegfried the poisoned potion.”28 This,
though Adorno does not say so, offered a textbook example of his analogy between
the phantasmagoria and the work of art. It does not seem entirely out of the question
that, as in the case of many a furious Nietzschean accusation, this second turn of the
dialectical screw not only profited from a Wagnerian simile but had actually in the
first place arisen in Adorno’s study of Wagner. A third, justifiable turn might note just
how critical Wagner’s practice is—even, if the anachronism be forgiven, quite how
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Adornian it is, or at least as we might read it. The phantasmagorical seduction of a
false eternity is nowhere to be found in Siegfried; if anything, it is violently rejected,
both in Wotan’s dismissal of Erda’s primeval world of fate and, in more political
terms, in the following scene, with Siegfried’s breaking of Wotan’s spear of laws, al-
legedly eternal but outdated as soon as they were hewn into cold, dead wood. Far
from presenting itself uncritically, even the Gesamtkunstwerk—an idea ever ascribed
exaggerated importance in Wagner studies—criticizes itself; it does precisely what
Adorno says it should.
For Adorno, Wagner seems to have borne special responsibility with respect to
musical fatalism. In a footnote to the Philosophy of New Music, he described music
as “the enemy of fate,” since from “the earliest times, the force of protest against
mythology” had “been attributed to music, no less in the image of Orpheus than in
the Chinese doctrine of music. Only since Wagner has music imitated fate.”29
Writing on Carmen for Thomas Mann’s eightieth birthday, Adorno explicitly made
reference to Nietzsche’s celebrated elevation of Bizet’s opera over Wagner’s
Teutonism. Taking his point further, Carmen’s “Latinate precision,” which might
be understood also to refer to the work as a whole, is contrasted with “the Ring labo-
riously” unfolding “dark oracles about the rolling wheel.” Erda’s realm of fate has
as its counterpart, or antipode, Bizet’s music starting “to roll in an allegretto on the
strings as if it were a roulette wheel.”30 Yet we should remind ourselves, taking
Adorno as a starting point but not as a final destination, that Wotan’s rejection of
Erda marks the peripeteia of the Ring as a whole.
Let us consider another example: “The more triumphantly Wagner’s music
sounds, the less can it find within itself a foe to subdue; bourgeois triumph ever
drowned out mendacious claims to the heroic act [Heldentat].”31 Such an aperçu, a
typical Marxist Nietzscheanism, ought at the very least to have us thinking about
the Siegfried ofGötterdämmerung: in Peter Wapnewski’s apt phrase, the “rebel with-
out consciousness.”32 That, of course, is his fatal flaw, but what if we extend our in-
vestigation, Adorno-like, from the personal to the social? Does Siegfried, heralded
not only by Wagner but by the young Engels in 1840—“What is theHannolied,” the
song of Anno, Archbishop of Cologne, “against the Nibelungen?”—commemorate
the bourgeois failing of elevating rebellion over thoroughgoing revolution more
truly than Wagner himself realized?33 We do not necessarily have to answer yes,
though it portrays Wagner’s claim to “make clear to the men of the Revolution the
meaning of that Revolution, in its noblest sense,” in an intriguing, unintentionally
self-reflexive light. And that is before we begin to consider the effects of gloomy
Schopenhauerism upon the erstwhile Young German’s revolutionary fervor.34
Nicholas Baragwanath is right to object that “Adorno’s application of Horkheimer’s
generic category of the ‘bourgeois revolutionary’ to Wagner and his musical
praxis . . . does not stand up to close scrutiny,” or at least begs a good number of
questions, yet in terms of the commemoration of revolution, the distinction Adorno
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teases out between “rebel” and “revolutionary” provesmore productive than onemight
expect.35 This distinction is, after all, critical rather than positivistic or even, in the
generally understood sense, biographical. For Adorno’s provocation concerning
bourgeois triumph’s drowning out of heroic acts remains well worth considering. It
might even acquire a queer tinge, perhaps via Hans Werner Henze—(ironically,
given Henze’s distaste for Adorno, whom he once met at a Vienna performance of
Götterdämmerung): “There is the sense of an imperialist threat, of something militant-
ly nationalistic, something disagreeably heterosexual and Aryan in all these rampant
horn calls, this pseudo-Germanic Stabreim, these incessant chords of a seventh and
all the insecure heroes and villains that people Wagner’s librettos.”36 Adorno, then,
like Wagner “himself,” presents a Wagner who proposes more questions than he can
possibly answer. Adorno’s Wagner may not be identical with Wagner’s Wagner—
whose is?—but his remains an indispensable Wagner.
3
The idea of the historical nature of musical material, with particular though far
from exclusive reference to Wagner, was not a matter only for theorists of Hegelian
inclination. Schoenberg certainly dealt with the German idealist tradition; his
library copies of Schopenhauer’s works are littered with marginal annotations,
some of them extending to the length of short essays. Nevertheless, he was above
all a composer—and certainly wrote as such in his 1911 Harmonielehre. In the
opening paragraph of the chapter “An den Grenzen der Tonart” (To the limits of to-
nality), he gives the example of the diminished seventh chord. In “early music,” it
had long performed the role of accomplishing difficult tasks harmonically, but had
also acquired another role, that of being the “‘expressive [ausdrucksvoll] chord’ of its
time,” whether in Bach, Haydn, Mozart, Beethoven, Weber, or “still in Wagner’s first
works.”However, that role had “soon played itself out. The uncommon, volatile, unre-
liable guest, here today, somewhere else tomorrow, settled down, had become a bour-
geois, was a philistine in retirement.” It had fallen from the “higher sphere of art
music [Kunstmusik] to the lower one of entertainment music [Unterhaltungsmusik],” re-
maining as the “sentimental expression of sentimental concerns. It has become banal
and effeminate. Become banal!”37
The stress on having become banal is clear. As Max Paddison has noted, Ernst
Bloch clearly derived a passage in his Geist der Utopie from Schoenberg, writing of
a chord once new, having “sunk irretrievably into mere ‘light music’ as a sentimen-
tal expression of sentimental ideas.”38 Adorno learned, took, extended a great deal
from both Bloch and Schoenberg. Even in the case of what for Adorno had become
a weakness in Wagner, however, there lies also a historical opportunity, or rather
an opportunity for the critical historian. In considering even such a “weakness,”
there can yet remain admiration for the skill with which Wagner mitigates such
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“weakness,” and moreover there can be implications for our understanding both of
Wagner in the nineteenth century and indeed for the nineteenth century more gen-
erally. The Schoenbergian view of the historical nature of material both indemnifies
and rescues Wagner (an Adornian Rettung, we might say). It is, moreover, a signal
of Wagner’s stature that he is the point of reference for this “becoming banal”;
Wagner is posited almost as a Beethoven-like figure, one without whom musical
history would look very different or, at the least, one who sums up an era. Wagner is
seen, as in that former panegyric, as Nietzsche’s “modern artist par excellence.”39
As early as 1956, Adorno offers a generous summary, perhaps not entirely at
odds with the Essay on Wagner but different in tone, divining truth content even in
Schopenhauerian pessimism.40 His Essay had described the “affinity with language”
of Wagner’s music (die Sprachähnlichkeit der Musik), and Wagner’s turning upside
down that hitherto metaphysical claim so as to become a “means of musical enlighten-
ment,” that is, of the rationalizing domination outlined in Dialectic of Enlightenment.41
Adorno does not now spurn that claim, yet he becomes more expansive with respect
to the positive qualities of that Wagnerian linguistic turn:
Music’s turn toward language in Wagner not only created hitherto unimagined
expressive values, not only gave the musical material a wealth of the most highly dif-
ferentiated qualities without which it can no longer survive, but also gave this music
a dimension of bottomless depth. It may have been characterized by a boastful tragi-
cality, something theatrical and self-dramatizing. It is easy to hold up the compari-
son of Bach, Beethoven, and Mozart as more metaphysically substantial, but all this
does is to drown out, with difficulty, the truth of its own particular moment. The
devalorization of metaphysical sense, which was reflected in Wagner’s relationship
to Schopenhauer, was appropriate to the state of social consciousness under dev-
eloped capitalism; the thing that makes it inauthentic, the murky and despairing
conflation of such negativity with the positivity of redemption, still did more honor
to the determining historical experience than the fiction that humanity had been
spared this experience. For Wagner, however, this experience was not some mere
Weltanschauung lacking in compelling force; it left its stamp on the musical form
[Gestalt] itself. The idea of great music, of music as a serious matter instead of
ornament or private amusement, survived the nineteenth century solely as a result
of the Wagnerian turn of music toward language.42
That claim for seriousness would be echoed in subsequent writings. In 1957 Adorno is
more critical of Nietzsche’s critique and perhaps implicitly therefore of his own, while
still maintaining its—and his own?—ultimate “progressiveness,” almost as if the ad-
mission of guilt were still made through the most gritted of teeth. The critical barbs
seem to carry less conviction by now, yet must be made, as if to cover the writer’s back:
Nietzsche’s critique of Wagner was higher criticism. . . . But he failed to make it
stick because . . . he failed to penetrate to the music’s innermost workings. There is
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something unconvincing about the Nietzschean questions, for all their apparent
mastery, and it fits in well with the reactionary quality inherent in the music:
Nietzsche was superior to what happens in Wagner, but at the same time he was not
quite up to it, in the same way that the dialectics of progress almost always thrust the
avant-garde back behind the very stage of development that it advances beyond. . . .
In Nietzsche’s invectives against Wagner’s decadence and play-acting, . . . one
cannot escape the nagging sense that they are not free of a latent philistinism, even
though he had a sharp eye for the philistine aspects of Wagner’s own nationalist
worldview. For it is unclear whether artistic quality and the truth content of works of
art coincide so perfectly. . . . The thesis that Beethoven’s music is superior to
Wagner’s because it articulates the idea of freedom and humanity as a whole, while
Wagner’s music, regardless of its inner tendency, resonates with the loss of these
categories, leads the critic into a disastrous flirtation with art philosophy in the style
of the Verlust der Mitte.43
It is easy and doubtless perfectly justified to exclaim “tu quoque!” yet we might also
understand Adorno to be engaged in unacknowledged, or semiacknowledged, self-
criticism. If Nietzsche were both “superior to what happens in Wagner, but at the
same time . . . not quite up to it,” then had this not also once been the case with
some at least of Adorno’s jibes? Had he not actually failed—and it is an admittedly
difficult task, this—to live up to his own dialectical demands, and does he not also
in some sense recognize that here? It had, perhaps, been all too easy to think of
Nietzsche, or indeed Beethoven, as preferable to Wagner. While it would doubtless
be at least as foolish to posit Wagner’s superiority, there might be heuristic use in ac-
knowledging greatness and difference. Wagner’s never having belonged “amongst
the stars above” in Adorno’s childhood, as we saw him admit to Benjamin, might
have occasioned critical distance but also a critical disdain that stood in danger of
collapse into inverse hagiography.
Moreover, in “Wagners Aktualität,” Adorno states that Wagner’s “verdict that
opera was childish, his desire that music should finally come of age, cannot be ap-
pealed.” For instance, number opera, as in The Rake’s Progress, could now only occur
“in a refracted mode, as stylization.”44 “The idea,” Adorno continues, “of a unity of
constantly changing situations, which in Wagner still oriented itself to the require-
ments of the dramatic action, has, to this day, not been fully realized. It would provide
the ideal model for a truly informal process of composition utilizing characteristic
models that would be both differentiated from each other and necessarily comple-
mentary.” Even though “the dramatic action was more important to him than the
constructive structure, . . . the objective tendency toward the latter is unmistak-
able.”45 Wagner, it seems, is being suggested as a herald for Pierre Boulez—as
Boulez himself would come to realize, especially following his work conducting at
Bayreuth.46
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Wagner’s Romantic organicism offers a legacy to posterity—to Adorno’s younger
contemporaries—stronger, richer, than that of any other composer from the second
half of the nineteenth century:
The very thing which ever since Tristan has seemed with good reason to embody the
subjectivizing process of music, is an objective reality from the point of view of the
language of music: it is the semblance of the organic as mediated by this language.
With incomparable genius, Wagner succeeded in creating in Tristan an almost
perfect unity between the subjective work, the specific musical achievement, and
the objectivity of the musical idiom of chromaticism. This was the musical site of
the phantasmagoria. What has been postulated and created, claims to be natural.
Young composers react quite allergically to this. But following the liquidation of the
organic language of music, music once again, thanks to its immanent organization,
has become the very image of the organic.47
Even the phantasmagoria of Versuch über Wagner, then, receives dialectical treat-
ment more positive, more reconciliatory, than one might have expected from the
purveyor of negative dialectics. “For the subject,” as Adorno went on to say, “is the
only component of art that is non-mechanical, truly alive.”48
Moreover, Wagner, or at least tendencies within his material legacy—Adorno
allows considerable slippage between the two—had already paved the way both for
Schoenberg and for the Hollywood film score, in terms both of expression and
rationalization.49 As Dialectic of Enlightenment suggested, television, which aimed
“at a synthesis of radio and film,” might yet prove still more capable of “derisi-
vely fulfilling the Wagnerian dream of the Gesamtkunstwerk,” the alliance between
“word, image, and music” being “all the more perfect than in Tristan.”50 Such was
the nature, in the words of that book’s chapter title, of “The Culture Industry:
Enlightenment as Mass Deception.” Via Richard Strauss’s “supple illustrative tech-
nique,” the decline (Verfall) of the leitmotif might have led to cinema music, whose
sole purpose was to announce a hero and situation to the audience.51 More sugges-
tively still, Adorno claims that the “birth of film out of the spirit of [Wagnerian]
music” shows not that mass culture was an external imposition upon art, but
that art’s “own emancipation” turned it into its opposite.52 Strikingly, he claims that
it is “especially the sacred Parsifal that employs the filmic technique of scenic trans-
formation [Wandeldekoration] . . . : the magical artwork dreams,” a suitably phantas-
magorical term, “its opposite, the mechanical [artwork].”53 That Wagnerian
inheritance of Parisian grand opéra, the panorama mobile, and indeed beyond it, of
Baroque theatrical spectacle, has provided the opportunity for many a coup de
théâtre thereafter, from the first Bayreuth collapse of Klingsor’s castle to Stefan
Herheim’s 2008–12 Bayreuth staging, in which that collapse was itself collapsed
into the advent of the Third Reich, Weimar vanquished, swastikas unfurled, the
phantasmagoria revealed for what it was.54 In such evocation—Wagner’s Opera and
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Drama term would have been “presentiment”—of the cinema, we might think of
Nietzsche’s accusation: “Behold those youths—benumbed, wan, breathless! They
are Wagnerians: they understand nothing of music,—and nevertheless Wagner
comes to rules over them.”55
At the same time, however, Adorno concedes that Wagner’s own linguistic
usage was more sophisticated than his “aesthetics of unmediated unity,” not unjustly
characterized as a “declaration of bankruptcy” (Bankrotterklärung), would permit.56
The road (or at least a road) also led to Schoenberg too. Moreover, that provides a fine
example of Wagner’s work being rescued from his own aesthetic claims (which, in
any case, more often than not preceded rather than followed his dramatic work). It
was, Adorno observed in his Aesthetic Theory, when dealing more broadly than just
with Wagner, the “conciliatory element of culture in art that characterized even its
most violent protestation,” which had “intensified in the history of modernism.”
What was anachronistic to speak of in relation to Bach, Mozart, Schubert, and even
Bruckner—it seems that the point here is the latter’s untimeliness—applied to
“Brahms, Wagner, even Chopin.” Yet what seems negative becomes, with a further
twist of the dialectic, “today. . . the differentia specifica of art in opposition to the
deluge of philistinism, and at the same time it is a criterion of mastery.”57 Wagner is
not unique, yet he acts more often than not as exemplar and as ne plus ultra.
4
Tristan was always to be preferred. “The source of the immense importance of all
dissonance for new art since Baudelaire and Tristan,” a Nietzschean pairing of
décadence that yet appreciates the modernistic seeds within that décadence, is “verita-
bly an invariant of the modern,” for “the immanent play of forces in the artwork
converges with external reality.”58 Moreover, “in his greatest moments,” such as the
opening of Tristan, Wagner was able to draw “progressive Konstruktion,” which
almost inevitably has one think of Bauhaus-like early dodecaphonic Schoenberg,
from the “gestural-regressive moment.” In such a display of “productive strength,”
it went beyond “mere subjective expression” so as to render that moment, “in the
Hegelian sense,” praise indeed, canceled and preserved at a higher level of mediat-
ed unity, that is, aufgehoben.59 From that analysis, that is, from engagement with
the score rather than with biography, aesthetics, influence, or anything else, imme-
diately arises Adorno’s celebrated, well-nigh irrefutable observation that “progress
and reaction in Wagner’s music” (and we should note that he specifically refers
again to Wagner’smusic) “cannot be separated as sheep from goats.”60
There remained both sheep and goats, though. Adorno noted approvingly that
“though traces of Tristan can always be detected in Berg, those of Die Meistersinger
cannot.” For “Berg’s music . . . never affirms itself,” unlike, presumably Die
Meistersinger.61 If Adorno concentrates upon Wagner’s darker side, the positive side
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remains: positive in its implicit negating—and self-negating—quality, the emancipation
of the dissonance beckoning from within an allegedly ahistorical Schopenhauerian rut.
Indeed, as Adorno admitted, albeit through gritted teeth, “If there is any truth to
the facile associations between Wagner and Berg, then it would be a similarity with
the Wotan of Götterdämmerung: not with the allegory of a self-negating world will—
Berg negated that before he heard the first E-flat of Das Rheingold—but rather with
the individualistic figure of the magnanimous, entangled, and weary god.”62 One
begins to understand what Adorno might have made of Wagner, had he been able
to summon up a fraction of the charity, or rather adoration, he offered Berg.
Wagner both contributed to and reflected that “modernity” when his form,
determinedly hostile to standard, feudal remnants, rendered material “more pliant
to the composer’s will” than had ever previously been the case.63 Such modernity
was a thing of wonder, just as in Marx’s celebrated paean to the bourgeoisie in the
Communist Manifesto—or indeed Wagner’s vision of a capitalist-administrated
society in Nibelheim and the Tarnhelm. In Marx’s words, the bourgeoisie had been
“the first to show what man’s activity can bring about. It has accomplished miracles
surpassing Egyptian pyramids, Roman aqueducts, and Gothic cathedrals; it has
conducted expeditions that put in the shade all former Exoduses of nations and cru-
sades.”64 Rationalization, it seems, extends further in Adorno’s Wagner than in
any previous composer, despite the regressive character of its outdated Romantic
“expression”—what, in shorthand, we might term that problem of the diminished
seventh, so long as it is considered as exemplar rather than rootless root. (One
might equally well select Adorno’s thoroughgoing claim that, in Wagner, Sein
[being] takes precedence over Werden [becoming], save for its more problematic
nature, namely that many more would dispute its accuracy. Had Adorno been more
dialectical, or allowed that Wagner had been, he might have seen that Wagner’s
writing is more properly accomplished through a struggle between the two.)
5
“There is no decadent moment in Wagner’s work, from which productive moments
of the future could not be wrought.”65 Not a single such moment: if that is not a pan-
egyrical claim, then it is difficult to know what might be. The idea is pursued, in
“Wagners Aktualität,” in Adorno’s criticism of Heinrich Schenker, whose accusation
against Wagner of having destroyed the Urlinie (fundamental line) missed the point:
“he failed to hear precisely in the supposed destruction, the emancipation of music
from its merely skeletal, abstract organization toward an organization located in its
specific forms, the irresistibly new element that was the precondition of everything
that was to come.”66 What held for harmony held even for the phantasmagorical ide-
ology of the Gesamtkunstwerk. For Wagner possessed “the power of the neurotic, to
look his own decadence straight in the eye and to transcend it in an image that resists
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the absorbing glance.”67 We might say, even though Adorno does not, that the
Wagnerian phantasmagoria resists itself and perhaps offers hope that late-capitalist
phantasmagoria might do so too: something of the “Happy-End” (the English was
his own) Adorno scorned in Wagner and elsewhere.68 Such happiness is of course
highly relative, for few others would consider the end of Götterdämmerung to qualify
as such—yet not impermissibly so, for those able to take a slightly less negative view
of dialectics or indeed of Wagner. Adorno might have permitted himself to do so
with, say, Berg; perhaps we might permit ourselves to do so with Wagner.
Adorno notes Wagner’s harmonic anticipations of impressionism and highly
progressive dissonance, contrasting his use of harmony for constructivist (for
which read proto-Schoenbergian) ends with Strauss’s later use of the same disso-
nances and others derived therefrom as mere cheap thrills (Reizwerte).69 The extent
of his admiration for Wagner’s harmony is summarized in the final sentence of the
Essay’s fourth chapter, that on sound (Klang). Having referred to chords such as
that in the third measure of the prelude to act 1 of Die Meistersinger, the Tristan
chord, and that signaling the Rhinemaidens’ warning to Siegfried—all of them dis-
sonances instantly recalled in the mind’s ear, for those who know the works—
Adorno makes a startling claim, rifling back and forward though musical history, in
a fashion not entirely unlike that of his celebrated essay on Bach and authenticity.
Such chords can only be “properly understood” when compared with “the most ad-
vanced material of contemporary music,” from which the “continuity of the
Wagnerian transition” (Stetigkeit des Wagnerschen Übergangs) had been removed.70
If Bach needed defending against his devotees, so, it seems, did Wagner—and it is
difficult to disagree with that. But more interesting still, it seems, reading the Bach
essay into the Wagner book, that we might understand Wagner’s heritage, like that
of Bach, to have passed into composition. Whether or not that made or makes
Wagner unperformable, or only difficult to perform, it did seem to be the case that
modernist composition might “call his music by name in producing it anew.”71
Moreover, if Wagner’s harmony oscillated (schwankt) between past and future,
“the coloristic dimension” was, according to the opening of Adorno’s fifth chapter,
on color (Farbe), “quite properly, discovered by him.” Quite a startling claim, which if
anything becomes more startling still: “The art of instrumentation in the incisive
sense, as the productive part of color in the musical event [Geschehnis] ‘in a way such
that color itself would become action,’ did not exist before him.”72 By contrast—and
here Adorno is surely alluding to Wagner’s own dismissal of Berlioz’s mere “me-
chanical miracles”—Berlioz’s achievement was merely material (stofflich), not proper-
ly integrated into “the composition as such.”73 Once again, Wagner’s music, that of
Tristan in particular, is posited as a progenitor of Schoenberg and “in particular,
Alban Berg.”74
Taking Adorno’s observation a little further than he does himself, we might
think of the Tarnhelm. The motif’s sonority, its voicing for six horns as much as its
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mysterious, rooted yet almost rootless harmony, enunciates the mysteries and po-
tential terror of new technology. Proudest creation of the skilled craftsman Mime, it
is immediately, sadistically turned upon its maker by its owner, Alberich. The
worker must be kept in his place: even when, perhaps especially when, he is one’s
own brother. This uncanny new device enables Alberich to become, or at least to
seem, a magician, portraying himself both to his terrified people and to his visitors,
Loge and Wotan, not only as a merchant but also as what Herbert Marcuse called a
“gifted economic leader.”75 Accumulation works—mysteriously, it might seem,
though with a perfectly comprehensible economic logic in practice—in one direc-
tion alone. The Tarnhelm depicts, expresses, and embodies the dialectic of enlight-
enment.
Moreover, this is not a case of miniaturism, Nietzschean or otherwise.76 The
motif provides the dramatic coloring and forms a good part of the musico-dramatic
structure for much of the third scene of Das Rheingold. Wagner wrote that it would
be to do “things by halves” were he to use a key for its own sake and thereby ignore
the instrument or, by contrast, to use the instrument simply for its own sake.77 His
ambition was to unify, indeed for there to be no distinction in the first place; and
here is a case where that ambition seems well-nigh fulfilled. Debussy, we might
add, beckons as strongly as Berg, or indeed Webern. The other side of the coin is
that Wagner offers an explicit critique of the totalitarianism of modern technology.
That critique he offers, moreover, through the most modern technological means
not only at his disposal, but of his creation.
6
Such mastery, as Adorno noted, led to the decidedly ambiguous wonder of the
phantasmagoria, to which Adorno devotes his sixth chapter. The (originally
English) term dates back beyond Marx to the very beginning of the nineteenth
century; however, it is from Marx’s usage, as well as that of the Baudelaire study of
Walter Benjamin, the “allegorist of commodity fetishism: revealing the return of
the primeval in the petrified objects of the nineteenth century,” that Adorno’s analy-
sis springs.78 Marx had famously employed the idea in Capital to describe the dis-
juncture between a commodity itself, its roots in concealed human labor, and its
form: “It is only the particular social relation between men themselves, which here
takes upon itself, for them, the phantasmagorical form of a relationship between
things.”79 But he also—perhaps as revealingly for Wagner, or at least for the
Wagner we might develop from Adorno—used it in the Eighteenth Brumaire of
Louis Bonaparte with respect to the dissipation of hopes of revolution: “The consti-
tution, the National Assembly, . . . the ‘liberté, égalité, fraternité,’ . . .—everything
disappeared like a phantasmagoria before the spell [Bannformel] cast by one man,
whose enemies had not taken him as a master of witchcraft.”80 Adorno makes no
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direct reference to Marx in this chapter, but he opens the next with the summative
phrase “world in a phantasmagoria”; we are at liberty, within reason, to pursue the
Marxian, Adornian, Wagnerian avenues we choose.81
However, to pursue Adorno’s meaning and its implications, the attempt to
connect the masterly spell of the Gesamtkunstwerk with that of the repression of rev-
olution fits Wagner and his moment particularly well. A treatment of Wagner as
“rebel” rather than “revolutionary” precedes the sixth chapter in Adorno’s book, so,
although that chapter concerns itself with the claim that “Wagner’s operas tend
toward illusion [Blendwerk], to what Schopenhauer called the ‘outside of inferior
commodities’: toward phantasmagoria,” that claim can no more be merely imma-
nent than any of the rest of Adorno’s socially bound critique.82 Indeed, a phantas-
magoria would have no meaning whatsoever in purely immanent terms. It extends
in Wagner from the Venusberg’s creation of its “characteristic sound through the
method of diminution,” a “diminished forte” prevailing, “the image of resounding
from afar,” to the description of Die Meistersinger as Wagner’s central work, insofar
as it presents a “sketch for an original bourgeois period [bürgerlichen Urzeit],” and
the phantasmagorical wonder of the spear hovering above Parsifal’s head, the hero
cursing its “deceiving splendor” (trügende Pracht).83 That is the history of the techni-
cal means that Wagner—and the nineteenth century—amassed to work the
magical dialectic of enlightenment. Moreover, as Adorno reminds us in the chap-
ter’s final sentence, following that quotation from Parsifal, “It is the curse of a rebel,
who in his youth stormed unforgotten brothels.”84 Whether or not we subscribe to
Adorno’s placing of Wagner somewhere uneasily between sensuality and its repres-
sion, it stands even here at the heart of the fascination Wagner held for him,
Freudian as well as Marxian: that is, at the very heart of the concerns of his philoso-
phy and, more broadly, that of the Frankfurt School. There is truth content here in
the very deceptions of the phantasmagoria, for with the “outlawry [Verfemung] of that
same pleasure it puts before our eyes,” the phantasmagoria of the Venusberg “has
provided from the beginning the seed of its own destruction.”85 It provides a slippery
microcosm, both in its truth and in its lies, of the bourgeois world itself, and
Wagner’s artwork is held up as its exemplar: “the Wagnerian totality,” like Hegel’s, we
might add, “the Gesamtkunstwerk, is condemned to collapse.”86 However, Wagner’s
phantasmagoria proves less regressive, less phantasmagorical—dialectically, phantas-
magoria itself, not just Wagner’s variety, proves less phantasmagorical—than would
be permitted by Adorno’s idea of gesture as deceiving non-revelation, involving
Wagner as conductor-composer in the “großen Stil.”87
Another composer who suffered a similarly hostile, perhaps even more hostile,
critique from Adorno was Stravinsky. It is interesting that Adorno, in his Philosophy
of New Music, picked up on the strong element of Wagnerism in The Rite of Spring
less often noted than one might expect. Stravinsky’s “primitive Russians,” he
wrote, “resemble Wagner’s old Germans, the stage settings for Rite recall the cliffs
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of the Valkyries, and Wagnerian too is the configuration of the mythically monu-
mental and its high-strung tension, which Thomas Mann noted in his Wagner
essay of 1933.”88 Adorno had already coupled the composers in his Essay on Wagner.
Stravinsky, he claimed, regarded himself as Wagner’s antipode despite, or perhaps
because of, a “deep affinity in the element of the primeval.”89 Yet today there would
be few takers for Adorno’s condemnation of the Rite, even though there may be
more who would remain equivocal or even hostile with respect to Stravinsky’s avow-
edly anti-Wagnerian neoclassicism; again, we may glean interesting, even “progres-
sive,” aspects from Adorno’s critiques of both, without necessarily holding to the
apparently damning judgments that sometimes might cloud them. For instance, the
“mythically monumental” in Wagner and Stravinsky would find not the least of its
musical heirs in Harrison Birtwistle’s interrogation and revivification of some of
Western culture’s foundational myths—as the coauthor of Dialectic of Enlightenment,
having “always taken the basic principle of myth to be anthropomorphism,” might
well have come to realize.90
7
When, then, in his more “mature,” though unfinished, Aesthetic Theory, Adorno
made a more general point concerning artistic extinction, using literature as an
example, Wagner had helped him to that point: “Although adultery filled Victorian
and early-twentieth-century novels, it is scarcely possible to empathize directly with
this literature now, given the dissolution of the high-bourgeois nuclear family and
the loosening of monogamy; distorted and impoverished, this literature lives on only
in illustrated magazines.”91 Likewise, when treating in 1950 with Bach and the advent
of pernicious “authenticity,” he held out in conclusion, as mentioned above, the pos-
sibility that, even if Bach’s music were no longer performable, “composition,” by
which he meant modernist composition, would call Bach’s “music by name in pro-
ducing it anew.”Was the same true for some of Wagner’s oeuvre, in terms of perfor-
mance, or at least of staging? That question may prove a case in which Adorno’s
method ultimately rescues a verdict that has come to seem untenable.
Take Lohengrin, for instance. In a note from the 1940s, part of what we might,
borrowing from Young Hegelianism, ironically call the negatively inclined Adorno’s
“positive philosophy,” Lohengrin and Weber’s Der Freischütz are described as works
that have become uninterpretable. It is a claim intended specifically in terms of
opera direction, a “particularly sensitive” world. “The wolf’s glen of Der Freischütz
and the swan of Lohengrin . . . presented in sensory terms,” he writes, “are impossi-
ble—their apologia transforms the works into illustrated magazines. If one abandons
and changes them, for example, into natural symbols, or signs such as the swan as a
cone of light, the works are evened out to that generalised human level which means
the death of all art.” He even went so far as to claim that Ludwig II, “who saw
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nothing in Lohengrin but the swan, understood more than the most spiritual interpre-
tation.”92 The reduction of Lohengrin to Neuschwanstein is objectively malevolent,
whatever the intention.
Yet if we extend Adorno’s method, trying to establish, along the lines of the
Young Hegelian idea of an “esoteric” Hegel, an “esoteric Adorno,” matters may
look very different, especially in the arena of staging. Adorno himself praised, in
“Wagners Aktualität,” what he described as “surrealistic attempts” at staging from
the 1920s and 1930s; they had attempted “not to mythologize Wagner in the sense
of timelessness, but to explode his temporal core, to show Wagner himself as in the
grip of history.” He therefore liked “Max Ernst’s idea: to have King Ludwig II
amusing himself in the cave of the Venusberg.”93 Adorno described a staging ten-
dency of his youth as a “trivial revolt,” the phrase itself not entirely unlike his vision
of Wagner as rebel: “Hamlet in a suit, Lohengrin without a swan.” But he does not
answer, in the light of a “crisis” concerning “whether art can outlive semblance,”
what the staging alternative might be; indeed, he seems to have thought that there
was none, Lohengrin having become unperformable.94 It is clearly not enough in
Adornian terms simply to return to Hamlet without a suit or Lohengrin with a
swan; indeed, he went so far as to say that “only experimental solutions” to staging
“are justified today: only what injures the Wagner orthodoxy is true.”95
Pursuing the theme of a Rettung of Adorno, director Stefan Herheim’s style of
Rezeptionsgeschichte, or perhaps Rezeptionstheater, may offer a dialectical possibility.
It might also be argued that it remains true to Adorno’s claim, truer than some of
Adorno’s more hostile critiques of Wagner, that “critical analysis of the effect of art-
works has a great deal to say about what artworks, in their character as things, have
sealed up in themselves.” That, Adorno admitted, though he did not pursue the ob-
servation, “could be demonstrated in the ideological effect of Wagner’s music.”96
Herheim’s staging of Lohengrin for the Berlin Staatsoper Unter den Linden has
attracted far less attention than the Bayreuth Parsifal mentioned above, not least
because, owing to differences between him and the house’s music director, Daniel
Barenboim, it seems unlikely to be revived. However, like that Parsifal and indeed
like so much of Herheim’s work, it was a multilayered staging that would doubtless
have revealed additional secrets upon further acquaintance. Even upon a single
viewing, an array of intricately interconnected ideas revealed themselves while
still—crucially—providing theatrical excitement, coherence, and engagement with
the work, not least in its musical form.
A controversial prelude to the first act, the very act of staging it being the initial
root of artistic disagreement between director and conductor—dare I suggest, as-
suming the roles ascribed by Adorno to him as critic and to Wagner as composer-
conductor?—showed Wagner both as puppet and puppeteer, an ambiguity to be re-
visited upon many of the characters. Apparently assumed into heaven, a similar
fate—albeit with an all-important distinction—would be visited upon Lohengrin at
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the work’s conclusion. Wagner’s presence was seen onstage throughout the work,
sometimes in multiple guises, both as puppets and as chorus members—frock
coat, signature altdeutsche cap, and all—and sometimes melding with other
members of the depicted Volk, both changing them and being changed by them. It
was difficult not to think forward to Hans Sachs’s ambiguous, dialectical relation-
ship with the crowd in Die Meistersinger—and thus, inevitably, to the problems of
charismatic leadership and Volksgemeinschaft never far away in any consideration of
modern German history. Herheim’s treatment of the chorus proved thought-
provoking. What might in lesser hands have degenerated into stock responses
showed instead a Volk dangerously swayed by the ministrations of a charismatic
leader and dangerous in its responses thereto. The foundation of Lohengrin’s
power, like that of Parsifal, was charisma alone, though it was arguably more sinis-
ter in this case: Parsifal must discover who he is, whereas Lohengrin—it is probably
better to leave to one side the red herring of Parsifal as his father—insists that none
may know who he is. As members of the crowd lost their individuality, illustrated
by their loss of individual modern dress, they found themselves—or rather, we
found them—subsumed into a bland yet fearsome force of social repression, per-
sonified by the “Protector” (Schützer) of Brabant.
The scene thus shifted to an impossible, Magritte-styled Eden, followed by a
make-believe world of horned helmets and other neomedievalisms: incorporating
yet challenging the work’s history, the German catastrophe again unmistakably
present, Heike Scheele’s Brabantian sets and Gesine Völlm’s offered a riposte to
those claiming to speak for a “tradition” that never really was—and certainly pertained
no longer. Lohengrin, when he arrived, apparently straight from Neuschwanstein,
was the menacingly kitsch instrument of transformation from an opera house in
modern Berlin—much of Herheim’s initial attention hinted at contemporary social
and cultural local politics—to a world of fantasy in which Gleichschaltung was the
name of the game, just as it had been once before under another seductive charismat-
ic leader with naught but emptiness for a core. We could read what we want into him,
and that was a large part of the problem. Like his creator, Wagner, he would ultimately
be assumed heavenward, but then, to seal the tragedy, would come crashing back
down to earth. Feuerbach, perhaps, remained; the Adornian Wagner had not entirely
sold out, as it were, to Schopenhauerian pessimism.
Throughout, exterior manifestations of theatrical craft reminded the audience
of instrumentalization at work. And at the end, we saw Wagner’s own reported
words, spoken following his dissatisfaction with the first Bayreuth Festival and
yet always disregarded by his would-be “protectors”—Schützer?—“Kinder, macht
Neues!” After the first Bayreuth Festival, the composer had urged his followers to
rethink their efforts the next time. But then, what did he know? In Herheim’s pro-
duction, Wagner found himself used and abused at least as much by the communi-
ty as the other way round. Was it the visible theatrical apparatus that let the hero
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and us down, or was it letting us in on a secret? Quite rightly, there were no easy
answers. As Adorno wisely noted in “Wagner’s Aktualität,” “If it is true about
Wagner [staging] that no matter what one does, it is wrong, the thing that is still
most likely to help is to force what is false, flawed, antinomical out into the open,
rather than glossing over it and generating a kind of harmony to which the most
profound element in Wagner is antithetical.”97 Herheim’s production, however,
offered another twist to the dialectic, in that it forced what might be considered
false, flawed, antinomical out into the open, while preserving a greater degree of “fi-
delity,” costumes included, than traditionalists would ever have believed.
8
Moreover, Wagner’s score remained, an equivocal agent, as in Herheim’s Parsifal, of
something we might be tempted still to call redemption, even if it were no longer really
possible in good faith to do so. Similarly, on the final page of Essay on Wagner we read,
“Tristan’s curse upon love [Minne] is more than the impotent sacrifice intoxication
[Rausch] offers up to asceticism.” It is rather music’s rebellion against its own “con-
straint of Fate”; only through total determination might it regain its ability to reflect
upon itself. (Such is, of course, the path to Schoenberg.) “It is with good reason that
the bars in the Tristan score following the words ‘der furchtbare Trank’ stand upon
the threshold of new music, in whose first canonical work, Schoenberg’s F-sharp
minor Quartet, the words appear: ‘Take love from me, grant me your happiness!’”
Adorno offers the rider that such musical rebellion might be “futile”; we may (or may
not) differ. He then offers the possibility, at the last, that someone able to snatch the
message from the Wagnerian orchestra that love and happiness were impossible in
this (bourgeois, administered) world, would find the sound of that orchestra changed,
offering solace that hitherto, for all its Rausch and phantasmagoria, it had denied. It
might yet grant new life to music’s “original appeal . . . : to live without fear.”98
That attempt at redemption actually comes across as somewhat forced, as if
Adorno were slightly guilty of following Wagner in positing the deceitful or at least
illusory “Happy-End.” Yet the fundamental truth of his essay taken as a whole, and
indeed taken in the context of his other Wagner writing, remains, spurring us on to
posthumous if doubtless ultimately unfulfilled attempts at further Rettung. Max
Paddison, in his classic treatment of Adorno’s musical aesthetics, concludes with
the following:
Most valuable of all is the dialectical “method” itself. . . . That his critical aesthetics of
music cannot be understood, interpreted and reapplied to changing historical condi-
tions without us actively entering that debate and, in the process, very likely changing
its terms is a sign of its authenticity. . . . Adorno’s incomplete project itself demands
continuing reinterpretation and critique: not in order to systematize and “complete”
it, but, through locating its terms and revealing its lacunae, to go beyond it.99
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I was reminded of Paddison’s conclusion only after having made my own small effort
in such a direction, but I am delighted and reassured to find that effort consonant
with his words. Or, in Adorno’s own words, “As spiritual entities, works of art are not
complete in themselves. . . . One relates to a work of art not merely, as is often said,
by adapting it to fit a new situation, but rather by deciphering within it things to
which one has a historically different reaction.” Adorno wrote that his position had
become more, not less, “ambivalent,” for “as progressive and regressive traits are in-
tertwined in his [Wagner’s] work, so also in his reception.”100 Those and the closing
words seem equally relevant to Wagner, to Adorno, to Adorno’s Wagner, and to ours:
“Because it does not, in the end, realize what it has promised, it is therefore fallible,
given into our hands incomplete, as something to be advanced. . . . It awaits the in-
fluence that will advance it to self-realization. This would seem to be its true rele-
vance for our time.”101 As Adorno insisted in his Nachschrift to the debate in Die Zeit
occasioned by publication of his lecture, “it would be a bad dialectic that immobilized
its own reason.”102 That did not invalidate what he had said in Versuch über Wagner;
in many ways, it was dependent upon his earlier investigation. Yet at the same time
the two were not identical. Performers, scholars, devotees, foes of Wagner, even
those who think themselves indifferent: let us all take note. Kinder, macht Neues!
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